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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine why so many uses of the word literal
(whether taken from everyday contemporary speech or the works of well-respected
ancient writers) seem at odds with the word’s theoretical definition and to explore the
implications of this disparity for those who privilege a literal interpretation of Scripture.
The examples will show that the meaning of literal was not altered at a particular point in
time, nor is it altered on an ongoing basis by a small subset of particularly idiosyncratic
individuals. Rather, the word is predisposed to behave strangely the moment it is used
outside the context of meta-discussions about language itself. This is because a common
assumption underlying most theories of literal meaning is that minimally competent
interlocutors understand such meaning tacitly. Yet when we explicitly describe a given
interpretation as literal (and then go on to explain what that interpretation is), this
suggests it was not already tacit to begin with. Since a key component of why literal
meaning is often privileged (and sometimes disparaged) is that it is thought to correspond
to what minimally competent interlocutors understand tacitly, this means the actual
interpretations one ends up privileging or disparaging tend to be divorced from one’s
supposed reasons for doing so. The result is that the pursuit of literal interpretation
(whether of Scripture or any other text) tends to lead away from the very thing that one
claims to seek.
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INTRODUCTION
Why do other people use the word literal so strangely? Many have asked this
question in exasperation at one time or another, whether upon hearing an acquaintance
utter, “It was so funny I literally laughed my head off,” or encountering an ancient writer
who teaches that Christ “is literally the Light but metaphorically a stone.”1 In my
research, I have come across too many bizarre uses of literal to discount them as
anomalous and have found that the closer I look at seemingly regular uses of the word,
the stranger they reveal themselves to be. What is strange, I have decided, is that we use
this word at all outside the context of meta-discussions about language itself. A
prevailing theme within these meta-discussions is that literal meaning is tacit to typical
language users, and there is usually no need to talk about what is already mutually
understood. Yet talk about it we do: according to data from the Corpus of Contemporary
American English (COCA),2 the adverbial form literally is among the 5,000 most
frequently used words in American English today, and the adjectival form literal sits
comfortably within the top 10,000.3 It seems we cannot help ourselves from talking about
what we paradoxically assume goes without saying. In this thesis, I will argue that the
interpretations we explicitly describe as literal outside meta-discussions about language
tend to be precisely those that deviate from our own estimation of what is tacit to the
1. Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 4.28.35 (ACW 41:136).
2. Mark Davies, “The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA): 560 million words,
1990–present,” 2008–, https://corpus.byu.edu/coca/.
3. Mark Davies, “Word Frequency Data,” http://www.wordfrequency.info.

1

2
minimally competent interlocutors we tend to highlight as exemplars of literal
interpretation within these meta-discussions.
By “interlocutor,” I mean any person who takes part in the communication
exchange at any point in time: the speaker or author and the original audience, as well as
any later interpreters. By “minimally competent,” I mean an average, reasonably savvy,
reasonably knowledgeable, fluent adult native speaker of a given language. This contrasts
with both “maximally competent” interlocutors who display significantly greater than
average cunning, expertise, or verbal ability for a given instance of communication and
“incompetent” interlocutors who fall below whatever threshold is thought to define
minimal competence for the task at hand. In our meta-discussions about language theory,
literal meaning is typically portrayed as something that should be obvious to a typical
minimally competent interlocutor. Yet outside our meta-discussions about language,
whenever we explicitly indicate that particular interpretations are literal ones, they tend to
be precisely those that are peripheral and non-obvious—the sort that only occur to
interlocutors who are either incompetent or maximally competent. In the pages that
follow, I will use the phrase “tacitly literal interpretation” to refer to meanings that
represent the mutual unspoken understanding between minimally competent interlocutors
and “explicitly literal interpretation” to refer to interpretations that have been specifically
described as literal using the English word literal or literally or any foreign language
cognate. In other words, tacitly literal interpretation is what we should describe as literal
based on our meta-discussions about language, while explicitly literal interpretation is
what we actually end up describing as literal. The reason I use the words “tacitly literal”
and “explicitly literal” to make this distinction is to keep this great irony ever at the
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forefront of our minds: we feel strangely compelled to make explicit what we allege is
already tacit, to say what should theoretically go without saying.
Previous attempts to explain supposedly anomalous uses of literal have tended to
boil down to one of two central claims: either the original meaning was altered at a
particular point in time, or the more customary meaning is altered at all times by
particularly idiosyncratic individuals. An example of the former argument is seen when
lexicographers such as Jesse Sheidlower offer a history of different strains of usage,
showing that literally was first used as an intensifier for true statements in the late 17th
century, was eventually used to emphasize both factually accurate statements and those
that employ more poetic license, and is today used both as an intensive and as a term to
distinguish between literal and non-literal meanings.4 The latter argument is often seen in
the work of scholars engaged in a focused analysis of a particular writer. For example,
shortly before exploring what Augustine of Hippo might mean by his perplexing claim
that “Christ is literally the Light but metaphorically a stone,”5 K. E. Greene-McCreight
warns her readers to “put aside any preconceived notions of what the terms ‘literal’ and
‘allegorical’ might mean, or Augustine may appear to be talking nonsense.”6 The
implication here is that Greene-McCreight can reasonably assume her potential readers
will have the same (or at least similar) “preconceived notions” about what the word
4. Jesse Sheidlower, “The Word We Love to Hate: Literally,” Slate, 1 Nov 2005,
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the_good_word/2005/11/the_word_we_love_to_hate.html.
5. Kathryn E. Greene-McCreight, Ad Litteram: How Augustine, Calvin, and Barth, Read the
“Plain Sense” of Genesis 1–3, Issues in Systematic Theology 5 (New York: Lang, 1999), 45. She posits
that “there are (at least) two possible assumptions at play here. He may be saying that Christ is literally the
Light because He names Himself thus but is metaphorically a stone because this prophecy is applied to Him
by others. Or, Augustine may possibly be saying that Christ is literally Light since the second person of the
Trinity, the Word, is active in creation (‘And God said, “Let there be light.”’), but Christ is metaphorically
a stone since ‘stone’ is less of a controlling metaphor for the identity of the second person of the Trinity in
the catholic faith.”
6. Ibid., 40
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literal means and will perceive Augustine’s statements as idiosyncratic departures from
this more generally agreed-upon customary meaning. In her analysis, Greene-McCreight
makes a distinction between what she calls “hermeneutical theory” and “exegesis itself”:
In order to gain a clearer understanding of what Augustine means by the “literal,”
“proper,” or “historical” sense, we must turn to his exegesis itself. Apart from De
Doctrina Christiana, if one were interested in his hermeneutical theory one would
look for example at On the Spirit and the Letter, which was written in 412 during
the same period of writing as De Genesi ad litteram. But our interest is in seeking
hermeneutical assumptions as they become evident “at work” in interpretation
itself. Therefore, we will need to look at instances of actual exegesis, where the
rubber meets the road, so to speak.7
As befits a scholar engaged in a charitable close reading of ancient texts, GreeneMcCreight assumes that Augustine’s instances of actual exegesis will further illuminate,
rather than undermine, his hermeneutical theory. However, I have come to expect quite
the opposite: a speaker’s instances of actual literal exegesis (“where the rubber meets the
road”) tend to contradict not just the audience’s preconceived notions about what literal
meaning is supposed to entail, but also the speaker’s as well. This is not a criticism
against Augustine or any individual in particular; it is a general tendency that manifests
again and again wherever the word literal is used to describe specific examples of
interpretation. The propensity for claiming one thing about literal meaning during metadiscussions about language and suggesting quite another when discussing actual instances
of literal interpretation is not limited to only the most rationally deficient segments of
contemporary society or to the most brilliant yet idiosyncratic interpreters of yore, but is
instead the most likely outcome whenever we hazard to make explicit meanings that we
allege to be already tacit. The meaning of literal was not corrupted at a particular point in
history, but was always predisposed to behave strangely the moment we decided to use it
7. Ibid., 39.
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outside the context of meta-discussions about language. I believe it is true what we say in
these meta-discussions: that there exists a meaning tacit to minimally competent
interlocutors. However, assuming one is addressing a minimally competent interlocutor,
meanings that are truly tacit should not need to be made explicit. Thus, I am initially
suspicious whenever someone claims that a particular interpretation of interest to them is
also the one that should already be tacit to me.
In other contexts, we are more accustomed to a healthy dose of skepticism in this
regard. For example, we are rightly suspicious when a talking head on the television
reports that “everyone knows” a certain political candidate is going to win an election if
we know the talking head strongly supports that candidate’s platform. We might think to
ourselves that the candidate’s success might not be so inevitable as this spokesperson
would have us believe. Rather, they might be trying to convince fair-weather supporters
of the candidate to participate in making history while simultaneously suggesting to
potential naysayers that voting against the candidate is a waste of time, so you might as
well just stay home on Election Day. Similarly, it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to tell
the jury “everyone knows” the defendant is guilty. Hearsay among members of the
general populace unfamiliar with evidence presented in court is irrelevant to the case, and
the courts work hard to insulate proceedings from the media and instruct jurors not to
discuss the case with anyone else until a decision has been reached.
My hope is that the reader will come to apply this same level of initial skepticism
to anyone who refers to a literal interpretation and then goes on to explain what that
interpretation is. If someone claims that a certain passage of the Bible should be
interpreted literally because God speaks plainly and is then content to give a knowing
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smile, confident that there exists a shared, tacit understanding of the passage’s plain
meaning, then perhaps the literal meaning is indeed clearly obvious. If, however, one
feels compelled to also expound the passage’s literal meaning, this suggests the
interpretation may not be quite so plain as one wants it to be. Similarly, if someone says,
“My kid took me literally when I said to count higher,” and is then content to pause and
wait for a laugh, confident that the humorous incident has been effectively conveyed, this
is good evidence that the child’s interpretation jibes with the plain meaning of that
command. But if one feels compelled to go on and explain, “She jumped on the couch,
reached up her hands, and counted to ten again!”8 then this suggests that the child’s
(mis)interpretation does not line up with the meaning plain to a typical adult language
user. Indeed, the incident is humorous and noteworthy precisely because it deviates from
the expectations of those telling and listening to the story. This is my central point: our
meta-discussions about language theory tend to insist upon a link between plain meaning
and literal meaning, but the specific interpretations we actually describe as literal tend to
be precisely those that deviate from our own estimations of plain meaning.
This matters because the word literal is only rarely used as a neutral term to
distinguish between equally legitimate interpretations. Rather, the invocation of this
powerful word either privileges or disparages the interpretation it identifies. In English,
the most common use of the word literally is as a generic intensifier: I literally laughed
my head off, I’m literally starving, I’m literally head over heels in love, etc. As with other
intensifiers such as actually, really, truly, and totally, the addition of literally is meant to
emphasize that what one is saying is true. So truth is connected with literalness in our

8. See Example 4 on page 51 of this thesis.
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language, and in many other languages that also use cognates of literally as intensifiers.9
In the United States, many continue to hold the Bible and specifically the literal meaning
of the Bible sacred: a 2017 Gallup poll shows that nearly one in four Americans (24%)
still prefer the statement, “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally,
word for word,” over the option that it is “the inspired word of God, but not everything in
it should be taken literally,” (47%) or “an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and
moral precepts recorded by man” (26%).10 George Lakoff put it best in his essay, “The
Meanings of Literal”:
The sacred status of literal meaning is no secret. The literal is typically viewed as
the main concern of the study of semantics; all else is taken as secondary and
peripheral. It is the literal that is assumed to give us our fundamental grip on
meaningfulness, on factuality, on straight talk, and on reason. The nonliteral is
seen from this perspective as dispensable—a matter of indirectness, exaggeration,
embellishment, interpretation, metaphor. The literal, in the classical story, is the
indispensible [sic] sacred rock that forms the bulk of our language and thought.11
Historically, however, we are almost as likely to disparage literal meaning as to
privilege it. Taking cues from the apostle Paul’s assessment that “the letter kills, but the

9. Examples of the intensive usage in other languages are not difficult to find. A Dumas novel
serialized from 1844–5 has a speaker exaggerating his account of war-torn Nimes by claiming he “literally
[littéralement in the original French] waded in blood.” Alexandre Dumas, The Count of Monte Cristo,
Modern Library Paperback Edition (New York: Random House, 2002), 582. Meanwhile, an 1880 novel by
Dostoyevsky has one character leveling the following accusation against another: “You literally
[буквально in the original Russian] soil everything you come into contact with.” Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The
Brothers Karamazov, trans. David McDuff, rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 2003), 64. There is some collective
denial regarding this fact. English translations of works that use foreign language cognates of literally
intensively sometimes omit the word, perhaps under the assumption that such usage represents improper
English, even if it is proper in Russian or French. On the other side of the coin, I have asked friends who
speak Russian and French if the equivalent of literally in those languages is ever used intensively, and have
been assured that the phenomenon is confined to English alone.
10. Lydia Saad, “Record Few Americans Believe Bible Is Literal Word of God,” Gallup, 15 May
2017, http://news.gallup.com/poll/210704/record-few-americans-believe-bible-literal-word-god.aspx.
Gallup has been offering these same three answer choices to respondents since they began asking the
question in 1976. While the number of Americans who privilege literal interpretation is still significant, it is
steadily declining. As Saad notes in her report, the 2017 survey marked “the first time in Gallup's fourdecade trend that biblical literalism has not surpassed biblical skepticism.”
11. George Lakoff, “The Meanings of Literal,” Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 1 (1986), 292.
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Spirit gives life” (2 Cor 3:6), many Christians throughout history have prioritized
“spiritual” interpretations over literal ones and reserved varying levels of disdain for what
may be viewed as the necessary and lowest first step on the path toward true
understanding. Origen had some of the harshest words to say about this necessary first
step:
[A]t first glance, the letter is very bitter. It prescribes the circumcision of the
flesh, it commands sacrifices and the other things that are designated as “the letter
that kills” (2 Cor 3:6). Throw all this away, as you would the bitter rind of a nut.
In the second place you will reach the protective covering of the shell in which
moral teaching or the definition of self-control is described. These are, of course,
necessary to protect what is contained inside, but doubtless they are to be cracked
and removed.
[…]
But in the third place you will find hidden and concealed in the [law and the
prophets] the meaning of the mysteries “of the wisdom and knowledge of God”
(Col 2:3) by which the souls of the saints are nourished and fed, not only in this
present life but also in the future. For this is the priestly fruit about which the
promise is given to those “who hunger and thirst for justice,” that “they shall be
satisfied” (Matt 5:6).12
According to Origen, literal meaning is “bitter” and should be thrown away. Even the
moral sense, contained inside the literal, is to be “cracked and removed” to get to the
hidden mysteries buried deeper within. There is an explicit hierarchy in Origen’s
threefold system and (at the very least) an implicit hierarchy to the fourfold method of
interpretation that held sway over Christian hermeneutics in Europe throughout the
Middle Ages, where the literal sense was either viewed as the lowest rung or outermost
layer one must traverse before attaining the worthier typological, moral, and anagogical
understandings. Outside Christian hermeneutics, we see literal meaning disparaged in
contemporary secular speech as children, non-native speakers, and people on the autism
12. Origen, Homilies on Numbers 9.7.3 (Ancient Christian Texts 4:42).
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spectrum are mocked for their so-called literal-mindedness. In the same vein, literal or
“word-for-word” translations of foreign language texts are often derided as stilted and
awkward, while dynamic equivalency or “thought-for-thought” translations are praised.
These two traditions, privileging and disparaging, exist in tandem—the only
unusual opinion about literal interpretation seems to be a neutral one. But whether we
privilege or disparage literal interpretation, we tend to do so for the same reason—
namely, because we presume literal understanding is tacitly understood by minimally
competent interlocutors. For those who privilege literal meaning, this might be couched
in positive terms such as straightforward, plain, and clear, and literal meaning is viewed
as the universal language most suitable for effective communication. Meanwhile, those
who disparage it might couch it in negative terms such as superficial, trivial, and puerile,
and literal meaning is viewed as the lowest common denominator that should be
transcended by those with the cognitive ability to do so. But if I am correct and the
interpretations we explicitly describe as literal tend to diverge from even our own
estimations about the meanings tacit to minimally competent interlocutors, then the actual
interpretations we privilege or disparage are divorced from our supposed reasons for
doing so.
To discover if a particular instance of explicitly literal interpretation is divorced
from a given interlocutor’s supposed reasons for privileging or disparaging it, I will use
the following three-part litmus test:
1. Does the use of literal in a given instance of explicitly literal interpretation
either privilege or disparage the meaning it identifies, or is it merely used as a
neutral term in order to make a helpful distinction?
2. If the designated literal meaning is either privileged or disparaged, is this
because it is thought to be tacit to minimally competent interlocutors?
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3. Is this meaning in fact tacit to minimally competent interlocutors?
Chapter 1 is divided into three sections that correspond to the three questions in
this litmus test. In the first section, Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory about the arbitrary
nature of the sign and the negative nature of meaning-making in language will help us
recognize the only circumstance in which a use of literal can be truly neutral: mere
distinction. In the second section, we will look at various recurring themes in metadiscussions about language to show that literal meaning is typically portrayed as that
which is tacit to minimally competent interlocutors. In the third and final section, we
bring everything together and apply all three questions in our litmus test to two texts that
privilege literal interpretation: The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics and
Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica. In order to show that the phenomenon of
describing non-tacit meanings as literal is not confined only to those who privilege the
literal interpretation of Scripture, Chapter 2 will examine various additional examples in
contemporary usage. Our final example, however, is a strange use of literal from the
same document that provides the word’s earliest attestation in English: John Purvey’s
prologue to the Wycliffe Bible. Taken together, this evidence will lead us to conclude
that describing as literal meanings which deviate from the tacit understanding of
minimally competent interlocutors is the norm, rather than the exception.

CHAPTER I
TACITLY LITERAL INTERPRETATION AND MINIMALLY COMPETENT
INTERLOCUTORS
The purpose of this chapter is to lay a foundation that will help us answer the first
two questions in our three-part litmus test so that we can apply all three questions to two
instances where the literal meaning of the Bible is privileged: The Chicago Statement on
Biblical Hermeneutics and Thomas Aquinas’s discussion of literal meaning in his Summa
Theologica. The first two sections correspond to the first two questions of our litmus test.
“Neutral” Defined as Arbitrary Differentiation
I had Saussure in mind as I crafted the first question of my three-part test, in
which I equate a neutral use of literal with one that merely makes a helpful distinction:
1. Does the use of literal in a given instance of explicitly literal interpretation
either privilege or disparage the meaning it identifies, or is it merely used as a
neutral term in order to make a helpful distinction?
Wrapped up in this are two components of Saussure’s theory of signs: (1) the signs used
in language are arbitrary, and (2) the value of signs is purely negative and differential,
rather than positive.
By “arbitrary,” Saussure means that the signs used to describe concepts in a given
language could be otherwise; there is no intrinsic quality linking a sign with its meaning.
He offers the following example in his Course in General Linguistics: “The idea of
‘sister’ is not linked by any inner relationship to the succession of sounds s-ö-r which
serves as its signifier in French; that it could be represented equally by just any other
11
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sequence is proved by differences among languages and by the very existence of different
languages.”1 Even with onomatopoeia and interjections (two categories of words that
seem to have a natural connection with what they signify) Saussure shows that the words
solidified by convention are arbitrary: in English, a dog says bow-wow and a person in
pain shouts ouch!, but in French, a dog says ouaoua, and a person screams aie!2
By “negative” and “differential,” Saussure emphasizes that the meaning of words
comes from their distinction from and opposition to one another rather than any inherent
value. He offers an example of a non-linguistic sign to illustrate the point: “A coin
nominally worth five francs may contain less than half its worth of silver. Its value will
vary according to the amount stamped upon it and according to its use inside or outside a
political boundary.”3 The same concept can be seen with the various fonts and styles of
handwriting in a given language: “The value of letters is purely negative and differential.
The same person can write t, for instance, in different ways […] The only requirement is
that the sign for t not be confused in his script with the signs used for l, d, etc.”4
Saussure cautions that the word arbitrary “should not imply that the choice of the
signifier is left entirely to the speaker […] the individual does not have the power to
change a sign in any way once it has become established in the linguistic community.”
But this warning is tempered somewhat by his example of handwriting. While it is true
that the linguistic community will not accept handwriting that makes a w look like a Q

1. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, eds. Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye,
and Albert Riedlinger, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959; repr., New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1966), 67–8.
2. Ibid., 69.
3. Ibid., 118.
4. Ibid., 119–120.
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(unless it is known that one is using a cipher), there is quite a bit of latitude for similarity
between certain letters and numbers in a given typeface or written script: l, and I, o and e,
x and t, v and u, O and 0, 2 and Z, 5 and S, etc. Similarly, with pronunciation, there is
sometimes latitude and sometimes not. As Saussure reflects:
Every language probably contains certain elements or groups which, for some
reason, display pronunciation tolerance, while the pronunciation of the great
majority remains quite inflexible. The French r sound may be pronounced using
two or three consonants whose articulation is totally different. Indeed, such is the
difference to the ear that they are the first thing one notices in an individual’s way
of speaking. However, all these highly divergent sounds are accepted—are
‘legal’—with the same value. Yet the most insignificant deviation in the
pronunciation of an s or a d would immediately appear as a ridiculous
shortcoming in pronunciation or as the sign of a foreign accent, a direct and
irreconcilable affront to our feeling for the language.5
Similar to this pronunciation tolerance for variations of the French r, I have found
that there is a great degree of “interpretation tolerance” when it comes to words such as
literal that we use to describe meaning itself. The same interpretation may sometimes be
variously described as literal, figurative, technical, metaphorical, physical, spiritual,
actual, etc. without necessarily facing backlash from the linguistic community. The
important thing is to make distinctions between various interpretations that other
interlocutors can easily grasp; the words used to make these distinctions are of secondary
importance. Thus there is a surprisingly high tolerance even for describing as literal an
interpretation that another interlocutor might describe as figurative. This tolerance is
higher than for other adjectives. Although one might agree to disagree with a friend
regarding whether a certain swath of paint is green or blue, one could never come to
terms with someone who insists that a yellow object is actually purple. Yet when it comes

5. Ferdinand de Saussure, Writings in General Linguistics, eds. Simon Bouquet, Rudolf Engler,
and Antoinette Weil, trans. Carol Sanders, Matthew Pires, and Peter Figueroa (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 47.
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to the word literal, we are surprisingly tolerant not only with those who use it to describe
a meaning that we might rather call “physical,” “historical,” or “technical” but even
“figurative,” “allegorical,” or “metaphorical.” The difference, I think, is that we use these
words to describe meaning itself and especially ambiguous meanings or polysemous
texts: the act of differentiating between meanings entails the existence of various
meanings. Thus we tend to utilize these words only when we are already venturing into
uncharted territory, so their arbitrary and differential nature is more palpable than in other
terms more cemented by convention. For the vast majority of potential utterances, there is
no convention that predetermines barriers for literal and other kinds of meaning.
I will illustrate with a conversation that took place between my wife and me as we
were driving parallel to the outer fence of a gated community. Wondering to myself if we
would ever be wealthy enough to purchase a house in such an upscale neighborhood, I
asked, “Do you think we’ll ever live ‘beyond the wall?” As I said, “beyond the wall,” I
moved my palm in a circle on an invisible plane parallel to the fence we were driving
beside to indicate which wall I was referring to. Unfortunately, since she was sitting
between my palm and this fence (which lay outside her window), I inadvertently mimed
an invisible barrier between our seats with this gesture. I was surprised by the expression
of hurt she gave me, and after better explaining what I meant, she sighed with relief and
said, “I thought you were talking literally about a wall between us in our relationship.”
There is no predetermined “literal” meaning of my idiosyncratic statement-gesture
solidified by convention. Upon reflection, neither her interpretation nor my intended
meaning seems to fit the bill of “literal” in any strict sense. Although I had hoped my
gesture would guide her thoughts to the physical wall outside her window, I was not
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asking if we might live in that particular neighborhood at some point in the future but
rather if we might live in any house anywhere at least as nice as the ones we could see
beyond the fence. And although the invisible wall I had accidentally mimed between us
made the image of a relationship barrier unusually vivid in her mind, it was still just that:
a mental image.
In using literally, she differentiated another possible interpretation of my
combined statement-gesture in a non-judgmental way in order to clear up a
misunderstanding. Her choice of words was arbitrary in a Saussurean sense because she
could just as easily have said that she thought I was talking figuratively, socially,
metaphorically, philosophically, etc. and the effect would have been the same: it merely
prepared me to consider of an alternative meaning of wall. Thus, I would argue that her
use of literally was neutral in this instance. If, however, it could be shown from context
or subsequent conversation that there was a slight dig in her choice of words here, so that
by describing her initial interpretation as literal she meant to imply, “And the way I took
it is just the way any reasonable person would have taken it, you insensitive dolt!” then it
would be clear that her use of literally was meant to privilege the interpretation it
identified because it is what “any reasonable person” would understand tacitly. It would
then be up to the marriage counselor to answer the third part of our litmus test and
determine whether her interpretation jibes with the tacit understanding of a minimally
competent interlocutor subjected to my insensitive and apparently ambiguous gestures.
It is not necessary for interlocutors to have a thorough understanding of
Saussurean sign theory or be aware of the arbitrary and differential nature of their use of
literal in order for us to judge the use neutral by this method. The quickest test is to
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substitute the word literal or literally for different or differently and see if the same basic
meaning is conveyed. The substitution itself will test for arbitrariness, and our choice of
substitute will reveal whether mere differentiation is sufficient for the interlocutor’s
purposes or whether they are attributing additional value to the designation literal: either
good or bad. With this test, we must allow for the fact that different and differently are
less grammatically flexible than literal and literally. In cases where the substitution does
not make grammatical sense, we should interpret it as a parenthetical instruction,
“[Consider a different interpretation of the nearby message.]” Barring revelations during
the counseling session, my wife’s use of literal passes this test. She was essentially
saying that she thought I was “talking [differently] about a wall between us in our
relationship.” For explicitly literal interpretations that fail this test, we proceed to the
second stage of our three-part questionnaire.
Before advancing, however, I would be remiss to rely so heavily upon Saussure,
the father of what came to be known as structuralism, without at least mentioning
Derrida, the father of deconstruction. Here I will not do justice to the complexity and
nuance of Derrida’s intentionally misspelled and notoriously indefinable neologism
différance, but will rehash the oft-repeated observation that his invention plays on the
French verb différer, which means both “to differ” and “to defer.” At the risk of
oversimplification, I will say that Derrida’s notion of différance adds to Saussure’s point
about negative differentiation in language an unrelenting emphasis on how meaning in
language is always deferred in a never-ending, self-referential loop. The classic
illustration of this deferral is looking up a word in a dictionary to learn its “meaning” and
then having to look up the words comprising that definition and the definitions of those
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definitions ad nauseum until the various rabbit holes eventually circle back on
themselves, using only words whose meanings have already been deferred. The third part
of my litmus test is a deconstructive move in that it holds those who use literal to
privilege or disparage an interpretation accountable to their supposed reasons for doing
so, but the test as a whole is quite limited in its capacity for devastation. Interlocutors
who can be shown to neither privilege nor disparage an interpretation through their use of
literal will not be destroyed, and I will have no comment on the meaningfulness or
meaninglessness of language that does not include the term literal. But what I can offer is
a simple method for taking certain claims about literal meaning to task and a description
of general tendencies in our collective use of literal that—while they may not preclude
one from pursuing literal interpretation—nevertheless serves as a warning that this
pursuit may not lead one where one wants to go, if the predictable unspoken
understanding of minimally competent interlocutors is what one seeks.
Literal Meaning as That Which Is Tacit to Minimally Competent Interlocutors
If we determine that the use of literal in a given instance of explicitly literal
interpretation does more than simply create a helpful distinction according to the criteria
outlined above, we advance to the second part of our litmus test:
2. If the designated literal meaning is either privileged or disparaged, is this
because it is thought to be tacit to minimally competent interlocutors?
The word tacit is not one you are likely to find in formal definitions of literal, yet if our
quintessential claims about the nature of literal meaning are true, then the tacitness of
literal meaning is a necessary corollary. Many of the positive terms we associate with
literal meaning (simple, plain, ordinary, normal, straightforward, obvious, etc.) carry
with them the notion that such meaning is readily apparent to minimally competent
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interlocutors. The more disparaging words we associate with literal meaning (superficial,
trivial, puerile, etc.) carry with them the notion that these incorrect or incomplete
interpretations are tacit to both incompetent and minimally competent interlocutors
alike—but whereas incompetent interlocutors are stuck with their incomplete or
erroneous initial impressions, minimally competent interlocutors are able to perceive and
then transcend them. According to some theories of language comprehension, this ability
to transcend one’s initial tacit understanding is part of what makes a minimally
competent interlocutor minimally competent.
One such theory of language is seen in the standard pragmatic model of metaphor
comprehension, in which language users seek literal meaning by default, and enquire no
further when literal meaning makes sense in context. Only when literal interpretation
renders incomprehensible or absurd meanings do language users begin searching for
alternative figurative interpretations. A corollary assumption to this model is that literal
interpretation is automatic and involuntary for minimally competent interlocutors, while
figurative interpretation is optional and requires additional processing time—quite
possibly even additional knowledge or skill to be understood correctly. John Searle’s
formulation is often cited6 as representative of this view: “Where the utterance is
defective if taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from sentence
meaning.”7

6. Sam Glucksberg, Understanding Figurative Language: From Metaphors to Idioms Oxford
Psychology Series 36 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 10; George Lakoff, “Contemporary
Theory of Metaphor,” in Metaphor and Thought, ed. Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), 205.
7. John R. Searle, “Metaphor,” in Metaphor and Thought, ed. Andrew Ortony, 103.
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Although the standard pragmatic model and its resulting assumptions still hold
sway over many of our folk theories of language today, it has been losing favor among
scholars who study the psychology of linguistics in recent decades. Sam Glucksberg and
his colleagues dispute the model for several reasons. First, studies have not demonstrated
any additional processing time required to understand figurative as opposed to literal
meanings. Under comparable conditions, apt metaphors are understood just as quickly as
sensible literal statements.8 Second, Glucksberg argues, fluent speakers process them just
as automatically and involuntarily: “We can no more shut off our metaphorunderstanding machinery than our literal-understanding machinery.”9 Third, the standard
pragmatic model does not explain how we interpret statements such as “No man is an
island” that are literally true but uninteresting when interpreted literally.10 Yet while
Glucksberg critiques the standard pragmatic model, both he and the more traditional
model affirm that minimally competent interlocutors understand literal meaning tacitly,
even without using those particular terms. What Glucksberg emphasizes, however, is that
metaphor comprehension is equally tacit, or (to use his words) “automatic.”
Glucksberg stresses that his use of the term automatic “does not mean that literal
understanding is not effortful or does not require complex computation.”11 Glucksberg is
particularly insistent that any defensible theory of literal interpretation must go beyond
the “minimalist literal” of word-for-word decoding:
An example from a recent New York Times headline makes clear the need to go
beyond bare-bones literal meanings: Price Soars for Eggs, Setting Off a Debate
8. Glucksberg, Understanding Figurative Language, 20.
9. Ibid., 28.
10. Ibid., 46.
11. Ibid., 10.
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on a Clinic’s Ethics. The linguistic literal meaning is not at issue here. Each of the
words and phrases in the heading is intended in its primary, literal sense. Eggs
refers to eggs (but what kind?); prices refers to the cost of something (but at what
level?); clinic refers to the medical sense of clinic (but what kind?); ethics refers
to what people ordinarily think of as ethics and morals. It is not until one reads
further that one learns that the eggs that are referred to are not the sort that one
scrambles for breakfast but instead are human ova that, if fertilized and implanted
in a womb, develop into human babies. The clinic is a fertility clinic, and the issue
is whether or not young women should sell or “donate” their ova for artificial
insemination and implantation in donee mothers. The egg providers can be
viewed as “donors” if they receive some small remuneration for their time and
trouble; they would be viewed as sellers if they were to receive a lot of money.
The ethical issue is whether or not human ova should be sold for profit. The
deceptively simple, literally intended headline turns out to require a wealth of
biological, medical, social, cultural, theological, economic, and sociological
knowledge to be understood as intended.12
Although Glucksberg argues that a wealth of complex linguistic and nonlinguistic
knowledge is required to correctly interpret this deceptively simple headline, he is
adamant that “fluent speakers of a language do not have the option of refusing to
understand.”13 More importantly, this understanding comes quickly, naturally, and
automatically because “contextually appropriate meaning is selectively accessed
whenever the context makes absolutely clear which meaning of an ambiguous word is
intended.”14 Glucksberg maintains that this is true whether one intends something
literally or metaphorically. Thus, literal interpretation is more complex (in terms of
required knowledge and context) and metaphor interpretation simpler (in terms of
required processing time) than the standard pragmatic model would have us believe.
Given sufficient context, minimally competent interlocutors understand both metaphors
and literal statements tacitly.

12. Ibid., 16.
13. Ibid., 21.
14. Ibid., 17.
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We have just looked at two traditional claims about literal meaning along with
Glucksberg’s critique of them: (1) we interpret literally by default, only seeking
figurative meaning when literal meaning is absurd, and (2) literal meaning can be
paraphrased as “word-for-word” meaning; it stands on its own rather than being context
dependent. Glucksberg disputes both claims, but in both cases, the tacitness of literal
meaning is affirmed whether one follows the standard pragmatic model of metaphor
comprehension or accepts Gluksberg’s critique of that model. In the traditional view, ease
of interpretation is one of the things that distinguishes literal meaning from metaphor,
while according to Glucksberg, apt metaphors and literal meaning are equally tacit (or, to
use his terms, automatic and involuntary), and context is required to correctly interpret
either type.
The tensions between traditional and contemporary theories of literal
interpretation can be seen in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) entry for just one of
the many senses of literal it records.15 There are three main parts to this particular
definition. The first part, “designating the primary, original, or etymological sense of a
word…” suggests a traditional word-for-word, context-independent theory of literal
interpretation. The term “primary” suggests interpreting individual words in the way
typical, minimally competent interlocutors would: according to their most common or
basic meaning. The terms “original” and “etymological” suggest interpreting words as
minimally competent interlocutors did when these words were first introduced into
English. The second part of the definition, “…or the exact sense expressed by the actual
wording of a phrase or passage…” would appeal to Glucksberg since it takes the
surrounding context into account. This reminds us that literal interpretation sometimes
15

Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. “literal,” http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/109055.
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moves beyond the minimalist literal of word-for-word decoding but is still grounded in
the “exact” and “actual” meaning that should be tacit to minimally competent
interlocutors. The third part, “…as distinguished from any extended sense, metaphorical
meaning, or underlying significance” introduces some exclusionary criteria: literal
meaning is that which is derived after considering some necessary amount of context, but
perhaps not if that context suggests an interpretation that is considered antithetical to
literal meaning. How do we know, at a glance, what is antithetical to literal meaning? The
notion of tacitness is a common thread that weaves the disparate concepts of “underlying
significance,” “extended sense,” and “metaphorical meaning” together. Tacit
understandings are plain for all to see, unlike those that lie underneath the “surface” of
the text. Tacit understandings are apparent from the beginning, unlike those that extend
beyond initial impressions. And finally (if one subscribes to the standard pragmatic
model), tacitly literal understandings are the first that an interpreter will consider, while
metaphorical meanings will come later, if at all. Because metaphor, underlying
significance, and extended meaning are considered anathema to tacit understanding (for
those who do not share Glucksberg’s views), an interpretation that includes them may be
judged non-literal even if it is the most contextually appropriate and readily understood
interpretation.
If we were to read this entry from the OED through the lens of deconstruction,
Derrida would want us to recognize that the prevalence of “or” is astonishing. If literal
meaning defers to the “primary” or “original” or “etymological” sense of individual
words or the wording of a phrase or passage, it would seem we might have leeway to
describe as literal nearly any interpretation we choose. With regard to “primary”
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meanings, Derrida would point out that different dictionaries list different senses as the
first definition under a given headword and that some words have dozens or (in the case
of set) well over a hundred distinct senses that vie for the position. And even if we could
maintain a constantly updated electronic dictionary that objectively determined the most
common “primary” meaning of words in contemporary usage through relentless data
collection and analysis, would we be willing to defer literal meaning to changes in usage
as different senses of words are born and rise to prominence? When it comes to the
“original” meaning of a word, will we defer literal meaning to new discoveries of old
manuscripts that bump the date of a word’s first attestation back a few centuries? And
with regard to etymological meanings, are we willing to defer back to Proto-IndoEuropean, or do we stop at Old French or maybe Latin? And to set the record straight, if
we are going to be taking context into account, are we looking at phrases or longer
passages, what are the boundaries of these passages, and how are they determined?
For our current project, we will simply note that answers to these deconstructive
questions are likely to solidify the link between literal meaning and minimally competent
interlocutors. The average person has a reasonably good grasp of the primary meaning of
words in their active vocabulary without the need for up-to-date analysis of compendiums
of usage. Some words may have two or more senses that seem equally qualified as
candidates for “primary” meaning, but words are not spoken in a vacuum, and the
surrounding context usually makes clear to a normal language user which sense of
polysemous words contributes to the literal meaning of the surrounding phrase, sentence,
etc. The amount of context needed to determine literal meaning varies, but a typical
language user knows intuitively when they have sufficient context to state with
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confidence that they have understood the literal meaning. Echoing a certain Supreme
Court Justice, we might say, “I cannot define literal meaning, but I still know it when I
see it.”
We may indeed know literal meaning when we see it, but curiously what we see is
not what we tend to say out loud. In this section, we have been examining evidence that
tacitness is an underlying assumption of several common conceptualizations of literal
meaning despite the term’s absence from most formal definitions of literal. We have
looked at the standard pragmatic model of metaphor comprehension and Sam
Glucksberg’s critique of that model, and we have examined prototypical definitions of
literal exemplified by the OED and possible answers to a deconstructive reading of the
contradictions in this definition. In each of these examples, we have seen that literal
meaning, whatever else it may be, is tacitly understood by minimally competent
interlocutors. One might expect, then, that the meanings we describe as literal would tend
to coincide with what a typical language user understands tacitly. But as we will see in
the examples that follow below and continue in Chapter 2, this is not usually the case.
Explicitly literal interpretation (what we describe as literal) tends to diverge from tacitly
literal interpretation (what we should describe as literal if we truly believed that
minimally competent interlocutors are exemplars).
Applying the Litmus Test to Two Texts That Privilege Literal Interpretation of the
Bible
Recall from above that the OED lists possible exclusionary criteria that might
keep the most contextually appropriate meaning of a message from being considered its
literal meaning: “extended sense,” “metaphorical meaning,” and “underlying
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significance.” We will now consider two fringe definitions of literal interpretation that do
not allow for any of these exclusionary criteria, instead deferring doggedly to
contextually appropriate meaning, whatever that may be. In both cases, literal meaning is
equated with authorial intent, even when this overlaps with what we would otherwise
consider figurative and, therefore, antithetical to literal meaning.
Our first text comes from Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica. Near the
beginning of his magnum opus, Aquinas claims, “[T]he literal sense is that which the
author intends, and […] the author of Holy Writ is God.”16 Aquinas also specifies that if
God, the author, intends it as such, then the Bible’s literal meaning can be what we might
otherwise describe as metaphorical: “When Scripture speaks of God’s arm, the literal
sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member,
namely operative power.”17 Let us begin by asking the first question in our litmus test:
1. Does the use of literal in a given instance of explicitly literal interpretation
either privilege or disparage the meaning it identifies, or is it merely used as a
neutral term in order to make a helpful distinction?
Aquinas equates literal meaning with what God, as author, intends; clearly, he privileges
literal meaning. While he does make a helpful distinction between two senses of God’s
arm, this is far from a “mere” distinction. Aquinas would not be saying the same thing if
we substituted different for literal: “the [different] sense is that which the author intends,
and […] [T]he author of Holy Writ is God.” Or, “When Scripture speaks of God’s arm,
the [different] sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this
member, namely operative power.” For Aquinas, it is vital that one not only see operative

16. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.1.10.
17. Ibid.
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power as the correct interpretation of “God’s arm” but also as its literal interpretation.
Moving on to our second question:
2. If the designated literal meaning is either privileged or disparaged, is this
because it is thought to be tacit to minimally competent interlocutors?
In this case our answer is a bit complicated because Aquinas privileges literal
meaning for two reasons: (1) it is what God, the most maximally competent interlocutor
possible, intends and (2) it is what God’s people, as minimally competent interlocutors,
understand. The surrounding context makes it clear how important it is for Aquinas that
his hermeneutic not only align with orthodox Christian teaching but also be perceived as
easy to understand. It is not enough for God’s Word to be true; it must also be simple, for
he is responding to the notion that “many different senses in one text produce confusion
and deception and destroy all force of argument.”18 Aquinas acknowledges that there are
spiritual senses, but denies that this results in any confusion, “for all the senses are
founded on one—the literal—from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not
from those intended in allegory.”19 The implication is that even if the spiritual senses are
harder to understand, they are founded on literal meaning, which is plain for all to see.
Aquinas concludes with the bold claim that, even if the mysteries of the spiritual senses
remain hidden to some people, “nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this,
since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not
elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.”20 For Aquinas, it is vital that
spiritual truths, which may be harder to understand, be superfluous, inessential, and
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
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dispensable. The sense that God intends must be the same as the sense most readily
understood whenever God’s people read God’s Word. This brings us to our third
question:
3. Is this meaning in fact tacit to minimally competent interlocutors?
On the one hand, yes, the meaning of “operative power” is tacit to minimally
competent interlocutors when they read of “God’s arm” in the Bible. As Glucksberg has
shown, apt metaphors are understood just as readily as sensible literal statements, but
Glucksberg would still call this a metaphor. Most likely, the reader can agree with
Aquinas’s distinction and his assessment of the correct meaning of “God’s arm,” but we
are more likely to parse the distinction like the modern-day Expositors Dictionary of
Bible Words: “It is the non-literal usage of [‘arm’] that is most significant. In these
passages, the senses of ‘arm’ are metaphorical, referring basically to the phenomena of
power and strength on both the divine and human level.”21 Why does Aquinas not only
insist that “God’s arm” means “God’s power,” but also that this is the literal meaning of
“God’s arm,” rather than its metaphorical meaning? This is not just backwards to our
modern sensibilities; it is a reversal of Augustine’s teaching on the matter as well:
Now to think of God as forming man from the slime of the earth with bodily
hands is childish. Indeed, if Scripture had said such a thing, we should be
compelled to believe that the writer had used a metaphor rather than that God is
contained in the structure of members such as we know in our bodies.
For it is said, “Thy hand hath scattered the nations (Ps 44:2),” and, “Thou
didst bring Thy people forth with a strong hand and outstretched arm (Ps
136:12).” But anyone in his right mind understands that the name of the bodily
member has been used in these passages for the power and might of God.22

21. Expositor’s Dictionary of Bible Words, s.v. “arm,” ed. Stephen D. Renn (Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson, 2005), 58.
22. Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 6.12.20 (ACW 1:192).
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Aquinas’s wording also suggests that even his contemporary audience would have
imagined a bodily limb of flesh and bone when asked to describe the literal meaning of
“God’s arm,” for there is no reason to write, “the literal sense is not that God has such a
member…” unless you expect your audience to assume the literal sense is that God does
indeed have such a member, while the metaphorical sense is that God is powerful. It
would seem Aquinas draws his o like most others would draw an e. We can learn to
decipher his handwriting and read him charitably with a few moments of familiarity
because language still works so long as distinctions are still being made, but we must not
confuse accepting Aquinas’s distinction between operative power and a bodily member
with accepting his reversal of which interpretation warrants the name literal. Aquinas’s
reversal may not be malicious. As Saussure reminds us, “It is precisely because the terms
a and b as such are radically incapable of reaching the level of consciousness—one is
always conscious of only the a/b difference—that each term is free to change.”23 But the
effect of Aquinas’s reversal is to collapse the distinction between what God means and
what God’s people understand tacitly. By illustrating his reversal with the relatively
noncontroversial example of God’s arm, Aquinas (perhaps unintentionally) masks the
reality that he is deferring literal meaning—not to God’s intent—but to his interpretation
of God’s intent, which he will then portray to his readers as if it were plain and obvious
to them prior to reading his lengthy and persuasive arguments on various subjects.
In 1982, more than seven hundred years after Aquinas wrote his Summa, the
International Council on Biblical Inerrancy (ICBI) drafted the Chicago Statement on
Biblical Hermeneutics (CSBH), intended as a companion to their earlier Chicago

23. Saussure, Course, 118.
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Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (CSBI). In the CSBH, they affirm the literal
interpretation of Scripture and define it as follows:
Article XV
WE AFFIRM the necessity of interpreting the Bible according to its literal, or
normal, sense. The literal sense is the grammatical-historical sense, that is, the
meaning which the writer expressed. Interpretation according to the literal sense
will take account of all figures of speech and literary forms found in the text.
WE DENY the legitimacy of any approach to Scripture that attributes to it
meaning which the literal sense does not support.24
This brief quotation makes it easy to quickly answer the first two parts of our
litmus test. With regard to the first part, literal interpretation is clearly privileged by the
CSBH. It is affirmed as a “necessity,” and meaning unsupported by the literal sense is
explicitly denied as illegitimate. With regard to the second part of our test, the fact that
the word normal is presented as synonymous with literal suggests that literal meaning is
perceived as being tacit to minimally competent interlocutors. However, the addition of
the technical term grammatical-historical (which is also presented as synonymous),
combined with the assertion that literal meaning “will take account of all figures of
speech,” complicates matters. The Evangelical Dictionary of Theology lists five aspects
of a biblical passage’s context that grammatical-historical exegesis seeks to understand:
biblical languages, types of literature, historical background, geographical conditions,
and life setting.25 All of this implies a method of analysis more accessible to Bible
scholars, seminary graduates, and other maximally competent interlocutors than the
24. International Council on Biblical Inerrancy, “The Chicago Statement on Biblical
Hermeneutics,” 1982, in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible, ed. Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D.
Preus (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984), 884–5.
25. F. F. Bruce and J. J. Scott, Jr., “Interpretation and the Bible,” Evangelical Dictionary of
Theology, 611–2.
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minimally competent laity. Ideally, this type of expert analysis would arrive at “the
meaning which the writer expressed,” and it would certainly strive to “take account of all
figures of speech and literary forms found in the text.” It seems, then, that the technical
term grammatical-historical is a more precise descriptor of what the statement actually
seeks to affirm, and that literal is the odd term out.
Norman L. Geisler’s official ICBI-sanctioned commentary on the CSBH nearly
admits as much: “To be sure the English word literal carries some problematic
connotations with it. Hence the words normal and grammatical-historical are used to
explain what is meant.”26 Why, then, did those assembled insist on including the
“problematic” word literal front and center in such a carefully worded and extensively
revised document? I think because there is no other word that can blur the distinction
between maximally and minimally competent interlocutors as effectively as literal. The
framers employ the term literal, not in spite of its “problematic connotations,” but
precisely because of them. The pliability of this term is what allows those who affirm
biblical inerrancy to assert in a single breath that one must consult the Hebrew to
properly understand a certain passage in the Old Testament, that another was not fully
appreciated as a typology prefiguring Christ until many centuries later, and that, with
good translations and the spiritual gift of Christian hindsight, all of this should be clear to
a twentieth-century layperson. And it is very important to these co-signers that the

26. Norman L. Geisler, “Explaining Hermeneutics: A Commentary on the Chicago Statement on
Biblical Hermeneutics Articles of Affirmation and Denial,” in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible, ed.
Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984), 898.
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meaning of biblical passages (yes, they believe there is only one27) be capable of being
understood tacitly by the simplest member of God’s family:
Article XXIII
WE AFFIRM the clarity of Scripture and specifically of its message about
salvation from sin.
WE DENY that all passages of Scripture are equally clear or have equal bearing on
the message of redemption.
Article XXIV
WE AFFIRM that a person is not dependent for understanding of Scripture on the
expertise of biblical scholars.
WE DENY that a person should ignore the fruits of the technical study of Scripture
by biblical scholars.28
Notwithstanding the caveats in each article’s denial, it is difficult to maintain that
the meaning of Scripture is clear to those who lack training in the finer points of biblical
exegesis while still affirming the grammatical-historical method as the surest strategy for
correct interpretation. The CSBH manages this by recasting literal as a technical term
that conflates the “normal” sense, the “grammatical-historical sense,” and “the meaning
which the writer expressed” into one concept. Thus the “normal” meaning understood by
an average modern-day reader is the same as what the author intended, which is the same
as the meaning derived by biblical scholars, because all these interlocutors are at least
minimally competent and share an unspoken understanding between them through the

27. Article VII affirms “that the meaning expressed in each biblical text is single, definite and
fixed,” and Article XVIII affirms “that the Bible's own interpretation of itself is always correct, never
deviating from, but rather elucidating, the single meaning of the inspired text. The single meaning of a
prophet's words includes, but is not restricted to, the understanding of those words by the prophet and
necessarily involves the intention of God evidenced in the fulfillment of those words.”
28. CSBH, 886.
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work of the Holy Spirit. The CSBH employs the term literal, not in spite of its
“problematic connotations,” but precisely because of them.
Saussure writes that “any conceptual difference perceived by the mind seeks to
find expression through a distinct signifier, and two ideas that are no longer distinct in the
mind tend to merge into the same signifier.”29 Both trends are at play here. Not only does
the CSBH tend to merge the understandings of biblical scholars and laity (as we have just
seen), it simultaneously seeks to distinguish between one type of biblical scholar and
another. The term grammatical-historical is rare outside evangelical circles, and the
preferred term for analysis that accounts for literary and historical context in more liberal
scholarship is historical-critical. The Evangelical Dictionary of Theology asserts that this
method theoretically has similar goals to the preferred grammatical-historical method, but
with the fatal flaw of rejecting, a priori, the possibility of the supernatural.30 On the other
hand, scholars dedicated to the historical-critical method might say that the evangelical
version has similar goals but bears the fatal flaw of assuming, a priori, that most passages
of the Bible correspond to historical fact.31
Taking account “of all figures of speech and literary forms found in the text,”
many historical-critical scholars have concluded that Jonah is a genre-bending anomaly.
Organized canonically as one of the minor prophets, the entire book contains only a
single line of prophecy: “Forty days hence, and Nineveh shall be destroyed!” (3:4).
Nevertheless, the terse announcement of doom results in overblown repentance on the
part of the Assyrians (and their animals! [3:5-8]) rivaled in hyperbole only by Jonah’s
29. Saussure, Course, 121.
30. Bruce and Scott, “Interpretation,” 614–5.
31. This is, indeed, affirmed in Article XIV of the CSBH.
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original rebellion in feeing to the westernmost edge of the known world when God had
commanded him to go east (1:1-3). Ironically, the success of Jonah’s preaching
technically renders him a false prophet according to the litmus test outlined in Deut
18:22: “If a prophet speaks in the name of the LORD but the thing does not take place or
prove true, it is a word that the LORD has not spoken. The prophet has spoken it
presumptuously; do not be frightened by it.” Nineveh itself is described with the
implausibly large diameter of a three days’ walk (3:4), (which is especially surprising
given that the population supposedly maxes out somewhere around a hundred twenty
thousand [4:11]), and Jonah’s response to the loss of his shade is the melodramatic
pronouncement that he should probably just go ahead and die (4:8). All of these
peculiarities have led historical-critical scholars to suggest that the text itself does not
present itself as history, but Geisler’s commentary on the CSBH specifically rejects this
possibility, arguing that Jesus’s words in Matt 12:40-42 refer to Jonah as a historical
person.32 Article XXII represents the only place where the CSBH itself (as opposed to
Geisler’s commentary) singles out a particular interpretation of a specific passage:
Article XXII
WE AFFIRM that Genesis 1–11 is factual, as is the rest of the book.
WE DENY that the teachings of Genesis 1–11 are mythical and that scientific
hypotheses about earth history or the origin of humanity may be invoked to
overthrow what Scripture teaches about creation.33
Geissler’s commentary offers some interesting behind-the-scenes information
about which science-driven reinterpretations are allowable under the wording of this

32. Geisler, “Explaining Hermeneutics,” 897.
33. CSBH, 886.
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Article and which are not. The Article is meant to explicitly deny “theistic varieties” of
“belief in macro-evolution,” but “the question of the age of the earth” is intentionally
“left open.” For a person who denies that church councils have authority over plain-asday Scripture, Geissler’s reasoning for this openness is interesting: “there is no unanimity
among evangelicals.”34 Here Derrida would have us catch a glimpse of where literal
meaning is ultimately deferred: unanimity among evangelicals. Literal meaning is not
that which is tacit to just any minimally competent interlocutor, nor to the consensus of
all biblical scholars considered together, but only to a small community of maximally
competent evangelical scholars who follow the grammatical-historical method, which
somehow precludes belief in theistic macro-evolution but remains agnostic on whether
the generations tabulated throughout the Bible should be calculated to support young
earth creationism.
Here it will be worth comparing and contrasting the CSBH with Aquinas’s
comments in the Summa. Like Aquinas, the framers of the CSBH would agree that the
literal meaning of God’s arm is power since literal meaning is taken to be inclusive of
figurative language in their model. Also like Aquinas, the CSBH ultimately equates
literal meaning with God’s intent when considered in tandem with the earlier CSBI:
The theological reality of inspiration in the producing of Biblical documents
corresponds to that of spoken prophecies: although the human writers’
personalities were expressed in what they wrote, the words were divinely
constituted. Thus, what Scripture says, God says; its authority is His authority, for
He is its ultimate Author, having given it through the minds and words of chosen
and prepared men who in freedom and faithfulness “spoke from God as they were

34. Geisler, “Explaining Hermeneutics,” 903.
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carried along by the Holy Spirit (2 Pet 1:21).” Holy Scripture must be
acknowledged as the Word of God by virtue of its divine origin.35
On other matters, such as the CSBI’s denial in Article II “that Church creeds, councils, or
declarations have authority greater than or equal to the authority of the Bible,”36 the
framers part ways with Aquinas. They may have done well, however, to heed Aquinas’s
warning from the Summa, with which he introduced his discussion of the second day of
creation:
In discussing questions of this kind two rules are to be observed, as Augustine
teaches. The first is, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is
that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should
adhere to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be ready to abandon
it, if it be proved with certainty to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the
ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing.37
In their zeal for Augustine’s first rule, the framers of the CSBH may have
neglected the second. Aquinas, meanwhile, warns against over-committing oneself and
defers meaning to a possible future where previously held interpretations might have to
be abandoned. If there comes a day when those who subscribe to the CSBH abandon a
previously held interpretation, it will be interesting to see whether they will find
expression through a new and distinct signifier, or recast literal meaning again in their
own image.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have explored what is meant by the questions in our three-part
litmus test and applied the test to two cases in which the literal meaning of Scripture is
35. ICBI, “The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy: Exposition,” 1978, in R. C. Sproul,
Explaining Inerrancy: A Commentary (Oakland, CA: International Council on Biblical Inerrancy, 1980),
48.
36. CSBI: Articles of Affirmation and Denial, 43.
37. Aquinas, ST 1.68.1.
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privileged. I believe these examples are timely in an age when 24% of Americans agree
with the statement, “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word
for word,” but it would be a mistake to assume that the phenomenon of describing as
literal precisely those interpretations which diverge from the tacit understanding of
minimally competent interlocutors is limited only to those who privilege the literal
interpretation of Scripture. As the examples in the following chapter will show, this
tendency is woven into the very fabric of language itself. This suggests that most of us
are predisposed to make explicitly literal interpretations that contradict the typical
assumption that literal meaning is tacit to minimally competent interlocutors and that the
slippery statements sometimes made by those who privilege the literal interpretation of
Scripture may not be intentionally duplicitous.

CHAPTER II
EXPLICITLY LITERAL INTERPRETATION AND INCOMPETENT OR
MAXIMALLY COMPETENT INTERLOCUTORS
The purpose of this chapter is to show that our collective propensity for
describing as literal precisely those interpretations that deviate from what is tacit to
minimally competent interlocutors is not limited to those who privilege the literal
meaning of Scripture for theological reasons. We will begin by looking at the intensive
and superfluous uses of literally in light of Paul Grice’s cooperative principle, which
predicts that audiences try to interpret each word a speaker chooses to include as
significant. Applied to situations where speakers use the word literal in their utterance to
guide audience interpretation of their words, this leads us to the counterintuitive
realization that we use the word only if we predict that the meaning we wish to convey
would not otherwise be tacit to minimally competent interlocutors. We will then shift our
focus to situations where speakers use literal to describe other people’s interpretations
and find that we tend to use it only for those we deem either incompetent or maximally
competent. At the end of the chapter, we will return to another text that privileges the
literal meaning of Scripture and includes the earliest attestation of literal in English
recorded by the OED. The strange usage in this text will demonstrate that the
phenomenon we have been examining is not a corruption of a once unspoiled state, but
has been the norm ever since this peculiar little word’s introduction into our language.
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Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the Intensive and “Superfluous” Uses of Literally
Paul Grice first outlined his concept of the cooperative principle in his essay,
“Logic and Conversation.” Although the maxims he puts forward in this essay sound like
prescriptive advice, they are intended to describe general truths about how language
works. As Grice explains:
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected
remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to
some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them,
to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually
accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by
an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the
exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very
considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual conversation). But at each
stage, some possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally
unsuitable.1
Grice goes on to describe four categories of maxims that, generally speaking, demarcate
conversationally unsuitable moves. The two that are relevant to our current inquiry are
Grice’s maxim of quantity, which includes the submaxim, “Do not make your
contribution more informative than is required,”2 and his maxim of manner, which
includes the submaxim, “Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).”3 Grice writes that a
possible consequence of flouting the maxim of quantity is that “hearers may be misled as
a result of thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess
information [emphasis original].”4 It follows from this observation that speakers who do
in fact have a particular point to make by including the word literal or literally in their
utterance do not flout Grice’s maxim. This leads us to a paradoxical conclusion. A
1. H. Paul Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” Syntax and Semantics 3 (1975), 45.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 46.
4. Ibid.
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speaker who includes literal or literally (l) in their utterance follows Grice’s cooperative
principle if and only if the speaker believes that saying what they want to say (x) runs the
risk of miscommunication, while including literal or literally along with what they want
to say (x + l) lessens the risk of miscommunication. This means that, at least in the
speaker’s estimation, including l will guide the audience (presumably comprised of
minimally competent interlocutors) to some interpretation other than the interpretation
that would have come most naturally to them, had the speaker said x without l. Our
judgments regarding whether the speaker was right to include l follow the same criteria:
if we think a minimally competent interpreter was unlikely to understand the speaker’s
intended meaning upon hearing x without l, and if x + l seems to increase the chances of
correct understanding (or if we can at least acknowledge that the speaker thought or
hoped it would improve communication), then we tend rule in favor of the speaker’s
choice to include l.
We can illustrate with two opposite reactions to a merely hungry person who says,
“I’m literally starving”: one objecting and the other accepting. If one objects to the usage,
one might argue that it waters down the meaning of literally and makes it difficult or
impossible for those who use the word correctly to communicate effectively. H. W.
Fowler, in his early-20th-century A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, complained,
“We have come to such a pass with this emphasizer that where the truth would require us
to insert with a strong expression, ‘not literally, of course, but in a manner of speaking,’
we do not hesitate to insert the very word we should be at pains to repudiate […] such
false coin makes honest traffic in words impossible.”5 According to this sentiment, if a

5. Henry Watson Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage (Ware, Hertfordshire:
Wordsworth Editions, 1994), 328.
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situation arises where it is necessary to say, “I’m literally starving,” in order to convey
actual life-threatening malnourishment, it will no longer be possible to do so. An
unavoidable corollary to this line of thinking is the acknowledgement that, in cases where
one deems it absolutely necessary to use the word literally (rather than merely helpful),
one thinks the meaning of the word or phrase x is different from the meaning conveyed
by x + l. If one believes it is necessary in a given context to say “I’m literally starving” in
order to convey actual life-threatening malnourishment, then one also believes that the
tacit meaning of “I’m starving”—taken in context and without the inclusion of l—would
have been “I’m very hungry” in that particular instance.
Those who accept a merely hungry person’s complaint of literal starvation might
point out that the intensive use dates back centuries,6 appears in other languages besides
English,7 and has now become the most common use of literally in contemporary
English.8 Sheidlower, for example, defends the intensive use on the grounds that it is
widespread “even in the works of the authors we are often told to emulate” and seems to
have enjoyed more than a century of general acceptance prior to any modern objections.9
If we are willing to accept the intensive usage as a fact of life, we will see that the
speaker who deliberately says, “I’m literally starving” to communicate “I’m really
hungry” does so because they think alternative statements (such as the slightly less
6. Jesse Sheidlower, “The Word We Love to Hate: Literally,” Slate, 1 Nov 2005,
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the_good_word/2005/11/the_word_we_love_to_hate.html.
7. See footnote 9 from introduction.
8. This is why dictionaries marketed to second-language learners, which tend to organize entries
according to frequency of use rather than earliest attestation, sometimes include the intensive use of
literally as the primary definition under its headword. For example, although its editors include a
disclaimer, “Some careful speakers of English think this use is incorrect,” the first thing the 5th edition
Collins COBUILD Advanced Learner’s Dictionary has to say about literally is “You can use literally to
emphasize a statement” (Bishopbriggs, Glasgow: HarperCollins, 2005), 840.
9. Sheidlower, “The Word We Love to Hate.”
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hyperbolic “I’m starving,” without literally, or the accurate but bland “I’m really
hungry”) will not convey the appropriate severity of gastronomic discomfort to the
audience. Emphasis, then, is a sort of affirmative action the speaker employs to
counteract the speaker’s expectation that the audience will not take the words seriously
enough.10 Thus, a more accepting response still reiterates that a speaker’s choice to make
an interpretation explicitly literal by adding l coincides with a speaker’s prediction
(whether accurate or false) that what they want to say would not otherwise be understood
by minimally competent interlocutors.
Therefore both responses to the intensive usage show that speakers use the word
literally in their utterances to guide audiences toward interpretations that the speaker
deems non-tacit. The reverse is also true: when audiences encounter the word literally,
they treat it as a cue to reinterpret their initial tacit understanding of what the speaker was
trying to communicate. This is why seemingly superfluous uses of literally tend to bother
us. The Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary describes this use as synonymous
with simply or just and offers the example, “Then you literally cut the sausage down the
middle.”11 Literally, A Web Log12 developed a system of tagging some examples

10. Prescriptive style guides have rightly pointed out that there seems to be no end to this arms
race of hyperbole. Wynford Hicks, in Quite Literally: Problem Words and How to Use Them, (London:
Routledge, 2004), 132–3 theorizes that the construction “quite literally” was originally used by those
seeking to distinguish their use of literally from the intensive use before “quite literally” was itself co-opted
as a super intensive. She then concludes with two examples of the abominable construction, “quite literally,
in fact,” presumably spawned by those seeking to distinguish their meaning form the intensive use of “quite
literally.” One notorious speech (“Senator Biden’s Remarks in Springfield, Ill,” 23 Aug 2008, transcript,
New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/23/us/politics/23text-biden.html) by then-vicepresidential candidate Joe Biden included one instance of emphatic reduplication (“literally, literally”) and
the even more insistent “literally, not figuratively, literally.” But regardless of how successful or ill-advised
such attempts at emphasis may be, the fact remains that those who use literally as an intensive do so
because they believe the construction x + l will help their audience come nearer to their intended meaning
than x alone.
11. Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 4th ed., s.v. “literally,”
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/literally.
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“incorrect” and others “unnecessary” to distinguish between the two types of “abuse.”
Several snippets from CNN news coverage of the 2008 Iowa caucuses were tagged as
“unnecessary,” including John Edwards’s “Tomorrow morning, 37 million of our own
people will wake up literally worried about feeding and clothing their own children,”13
and Mike Huckabee’s “We also want to say thanks to our three children who are with us
tonight […] [o]ur older son John Mark, our son David, his wife Lauren, our daughter
Sarah, who’s literally lived in Iowa for the past two and a half months.”14
When these “unnecessary” or superfluous uses are denounced, the argument is
that, while the statement may be factually correct, literally should not be included unless
the audience would be likely to misinterpret the statement if the adverb were not present.
But it is likely that most of the examples that could be construed as superfluous are not
intended as such by the speaker. Two readers of Literally, A Web Log came to
Huckabee’s defense, each with a different theory regarding the possible intent behind his
choice to include the word literally in the statement that his daughter had lived in Iowa
for the past two and a half months. One reader suggested that that members of
Huckabee’s family might have “changed their permanent residence, sold their old home
and bought a new house or rented an apartment, changed the address on their drivers
licenses, enrolled their children in new schools, and changed job locations.”15 Another

12. The stated purpose of this blog, which has since gone defunct, was “tracking the use and abuse
of the word ‘literally.’”
13. John Edwards, speech to supporters at Iowa caucus, 3 Jan 2008, “Barack Obama and Mike
Huckabee Win Big in Iowa,” transcript, CNN,
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0801/03/se.03.html.
14. Mike Huckabee, Ibid.
15. M Sinclair Stevens, comment 17 Jan 2008, on Fitz, “Literally the Future of Our Country,”
Literally, a Web Log, 13 Jan 2008,
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opined that perhaps Huckabee meant to emphasize that they had “stayed within the
borders of the state, continuously, for the time period stated.”16 The thrust of both
explanations is that in order for Huckabee’s use to be correct, rather than superfluous, the
inclusion of literally must be an attempt to guide the audience toward an interpretation of
“lived in Iowa for two and a half months” that is different from what our most natural
understanding of “lived in Iowa for two and a half months” would otherwise have been.
Once again, we see that the speaker’s use of l is judged correct if and only if the
explicitly literal interpretation the speaker is trying to highlight is different from the
interpretation that—at least in the speaker’s estimation—would otherwise have been most
tacit to the intended audience.
The result of our expectation that speakers will follow the cooperative principle is
that, when we encounter l in their speech, we treat it is a clue to reevaluate the words they
have just spoken, rather than as a nonsensical sign meaning “interpret my words just as
you would have, had I not included this one.” This leads us into the strange position of
accepting explicitly literal interpretations that employ word play, puns, and double
entendres—things normally considered antithetical to literal meaning. Because these uses
of l follow the cooperative principle, they are not criticized as often as the intensive and
superfluous uses, despite their eccentricity. Consider the following one-liners, which each
rely on the inclusion of l to help audiences catch the joke:
1. A ton of people is literally 12 to 15 people.17
https://web.archive.org/web/20080705220831/http://literally.barelyfitz.com/2008/01/13/literally-johnedwards-2008/#comments.
16. Chris, comment 18 Jan 2008, Ibid.
17. CorfishPie, submission to /r/Showerthoughts (Reddit), 24 Jan 2014,
https://www.reddit.com/r/Showerthoughts/comments/1w1ctp/a_ton_of_people_is_literally_12_to_15_peop
le/.
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2.
3.
4.
5.

Spacesuits are literally made to protect astronauts from nothing.18
Peter Dinklage is literally a white dwarf star.19
Childbirth is literally an emergency.20
We come from where we come from, literally.21

In the first example, l serves as a clue to interpret ton as a measure of weight
rather than number, and the joke depends on the expectation that the audience would
more naturally interpret ton as a measure of number when used to describe people and
consider 12 to 15 too few (and oddly specific) to warrant the description. The second
example recognizes that we would not normally consider nothing a danger we need to be
protected from.22 The third example refers to an Emmy award-winning actor of European
ancestry, who was born with achondroplasia. Of course, the three-word phrase white
dwarf star more commonly refers to a stable, relatively cold star that does not undergo
nuclear fusion but avoids gravitational collapse into a black hole by the repulsion of
electrons. Even when analyzed word-by-word, two out of the phrase’s three components

18. cyberk25, submission to /r/Showerthoughts, 15 May 2014,
https://www.reddit.com/r/Showerthoughts/comments/25l43m/spacesuits_are_literally_made_to_protect/.
19. sangbum60090, submission to /r/Showerthoughts, 16 Aug 2014,
https://www.reddit.com/r/Showerthoughts/comments/2dorul/peter_dinklage_is_literally_a_white_dwarf_st
ar/.
20. submission to /r/Showerthoughts, 2 Dec 2013,
https://www.reddit.com/r/Showerthoughts/comments/1rxg9b/childbirth_is_literally_an_emergency/.
21. submission to /r/Showerthoughts, 22 Sep 2013,
https://www.reddit.com/r/Showerthoughts/comments/1mwko0/we_come_from_where_we_come_from_lite
rally/.
22. A pseudo-scientific defense of the smart aleck’s use of l here might point out that the vacuum
of space is, technically speaking, closer to the absolute meaning of nothing than what we find in everyday
speech (for example, we say “There is nothing on my plate,” when there are still crumbs, the last bit of
sauce, and the atmosphere above and around everything on Earth, or “I’ve done nothing today,” when we
have actually been breathing, metabolizing, letting our thoughts wander, and watching television).
However, the meaning of nothing is always context dependent, and spacesuits protect astronauts from
additional “things” besides the vacuum of space, such as solar radiation. Furthermore, even if we allow that
the nothing of outer space is closer to the absolute meaning of nothing than the nothing of everyday speech,
the point remains that the absolute meaning is not the most tacit meaning since the absolute meaning is so
rarely employed.
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have meanings closer to their core definitions when used to describe a celestial body
rather than a human being: white and star. Yet in this example, including the word
literally helps interpreters access tertiary definitions for two of the phrase’s components
and switch a general meaning of dwarf for a more specific one even though the general
meaning of relative smallness would usually be the preferred meaning in the context of
the full phrase.
In these first three examples, while including l certainly gives the audience a
better chance of understanding the joke, it may not be absolutely necessary. The
incongruity of describing a few people as a ton of people, of needing protection from
nothing, and of using the term for a rather specific kind of astronomical phenomenon to
describe a living person would perhaps offer enough of a clue that the words must be
reevaluated to be properly understood. However, in the last two examples, there would be
little reason to reevaluate the one-liner for a hidden meaning if l were not included.
Because labor is considered a medical emergency, the audience might take the statement
“Childbirth is an emergency,” at face value if l were not included. The addition of l
discourages, rather than encourages, taking the joke at face value and hints that the author
intends a play on the word emerge.23 As for our final example, the statement “We come
from where we come from,” sounds tautological without l. Tautology violates Grice’s
cooperative principle by flouting the maxim of relevance, which should be enough to
make the audience seek a less straightforward meaning, but perhaps not enough to help
interpreters catch on to the crude nature of the joke. Without l, “We come from where we
23. It just so happens that the word emergency derives etymologically from the word emerge. If
etymological meaning is an important component of one’s mental definition of literal, an interpretation that
heightens awareness of the “emergence” of an emergency may be considered more literal than the more
natural interpretation of the sentence, “Childbirth is an emergency.” However, awareness of this
etymological connection is not a necessary prerequisite for understanding or even crafting the joke.
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come from” could be interpreted as a blasé statement about the futility of trying to change
a person’s background, similar to what the idiom “boys will be boys” says about a
person’s nature. Adding l to the equation helps the reader understand that the first come
in this one-liner refers to genetic origins, while the second refers to male ejaculation. In
all five of these examples, the jokester includes l to guide their audience toward an
interpretation of the one-liner that is quite different from the interpretation that would
otherwise be tacitly understood by a minimally competent interlocutor.
Disparaging Incompetent and Maximally Competent Interlocutors
In the previous section, we looked at various situations in which speakers include
l in their utterance to guide audience interpretation. In each of these cases, we have seen
that the speaker’s use and audience’s interpretation of l leads away from the meaning
assumed to be tacit to minimally competent interlocutors. We now turn to situations
where one uses l, not to guide audience interpretation of one’s own statement, but to
describe the interpretations of others. Overwhelmingly, those we describe as literalminded correspond to those we perceive as either incompetent or maximally competent.
A prime example of an incompetent interlocutor we describe as literal is found in
the children’s book character Amelia Bedelia, created by Peggy Parrish. At first glance, it
may seem Bedelia’s problem is that she always ascribes a single meaning to a single
word: after all, she ices fish the same way she ices a cake,24 and she catches a fish25 the
same way she catches a ball.26 But what truly defines Bedelia’s literal-mindedness is that,

24. Peggy Parrish, Amelia Bedelia and the Surprise Shower (New York: HarperCollins, 1995;
repr., 1966), 19–21.
25. Parrish, Amelia Bedelia Goes Camping (New York: Greenwillow, 1985), 18–21.
26. Parrish, Play Ball, Amelia Bedelia (New York: HarperCollins, 1972), 42–44.
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whatever meaning her employers intend and whatever meaning seems most natural to the
reader in context, Bedelia interprets things a different way. She is apparently capable of
understanding that the word trim can mean both “cut” and “decorate,” but when Mrs.
Rogers asks her to, “trim the fat before you put the steak in the ice box,” Bedelia
decorates the fat with ribbons and lace,27 and when Mrs. Rogers instructs her to, “Trim
the [Christmas] tree,” Bedelia prunes it with garden shears.28 Likewise, she understands
two possible meanings of the noun camp: one emphasizing location (a camp might be a
particular place set aside for habitual camping, often containing permanent structures that
are difficult to erect before nightfall), and another emphasizing function (a camp might be
any place where one chooses to camp for the night). What makes Bedelia literal-minded
is that, whichever sense of camp Mr. Rogers and the reader will understand from context,
Bedelia will be thinking of the opposite one:
Amelia Bedelia looked all around.
“But where is the camp?” she asked.
“The camp is in the car,” said Mr. Rogers.
“In the car!” said Amelia Bedelia. “We’re going to camp in the car?”
“The things we need to make the camp are in the car,” said Mr. Rogers.
“Make the camp!” said Amelia Bedelia. “We have to make the camp?”
“Just forget it,” said Mr. Rogers.”29
The fun of reading the stories is that the reader knows Bedelia will misinterpret
things on account of her literal-mindedness, but does not know how. When told to
“check” the shirts that have been delivered by a laundry service, the reader might expect

27. Parrish, Amelia Bedelia (New York: Harper & Row, 1983; repr. 1963), [no page numbers in
this edition].
28. Parrish, Merry Christmas, Amelia Bedelia (New York: Greenwillow, 1986), 36–37.
29. Parrish, Camping 9–11.
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her to draw check marks on them (she ends up “checkering” them with red squares),30 but
one thing the reader knows for sure is that she will not simply count them to see if any
are missing. Stories about maximally competent interlocutors such as genies are fun for
the same reason: we know these entities will play with language, but we do not know
exactly how. Their literal interpretations of wishes not only diverge from the meaning
tacit to ill-fated protagonists; they are also beyond the ability of minimally competent
readers to predict—even when the reader expects something devious. If the genie is
presented with a request for a million bucks, the reader does not know if our naïve hero
will end up with a million male deer, a million oxford shoes, or a horse that is impossible
to ride, but the reader does know the genie will certainly not bestow one million USD
(unless our wish-maker is the beneficiary to a loved one’s life insurance policy, or unless
the cash appears instantaneously in the form of cascading pennies falling like hail upon
the defenseless protagonist’s head). Relative to both hero and reader, then, genies are
maximally competent interlocutors, able to outwit and surprise us. And just as with
Amelia Bedelia, who continues to surprise us with new depths of dimwittedness, the
further these characters venture from what is tacit to minimally competent interlocutors,
the more literal they seem to us. When Antonio forfeits his loan in The Merchant of
Venice, the human trickster Shylock demands from Antonio a pound of his own flesh
according to a maliciously literal reading of their contract.31 Yet Antonio is saved by

30. Parrish, Thank You, Amelia Bedelia (New York: HarperCollins, 1993; repr. 1964). 14–19.
31. Critics Sergio Costola and Michael Saenger manage to describe Shylock with a form of the
word literal six times in a single paragraph in their essay “Shylock’s Venice and the Grammar of the
Modern City” in Shakespeare and the Italian Renaissance: Appropriation, Transformation, Opposition, ed.
Michelle Marrapondi (New York: Routledge, 2016), 151: “As many have noted, Shylock’s perverse
spirituality is linked to, and dilated by, his perverse literalism. He pursues a very literal reading of the
collateral of Antonio’s loan, desiring a pound of flesh, and this literal reading of their contract ties to
Shylock’s literal understanding of vengeance, which seems to be based on the kind of retributive law
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Portia, who outsmarts Shylock by “out-literaling” him three times over. First, she argues
that since Shylock’s contract only mentions flesh, he is legally bound to complete the
impossible task of removing a pound from Antonio’s body without spilling a single drop
of blood.32 Second, he must remove neither more nor less than one pound exactly; the
scale may not budge by even “the estimation of a hair.”33 Third, when Shylock admits
defeat and reluctantly accepts a prior offer of monetary compensation for Antonio’s
defaulted loan, Portia reminds everyone that he has already refused this offer in open
court, and declared himself that he will have nothing but the pound of flesh.34
Children are often considered to represent another prime example of literalmindedness. An introductory linguistics textbook has this to say about their language
development: “[O]ne child, knowing that say means ‘to utter’, said about a sign: ‘The
sign wrote…’ rather than ‘The sign said…’ She had not yet learned the metaphorical
meaning of say.”35 This struck me as an odd way of putting it when I read the textbook as
a student. While it is probably true this child did not know the metaphorical meaning of
say, she invented a novel metaphorical meaning for wrote to compensate, so it is not as if
metaphor comprehension as such were beyond this child’s capabilities. The standard
expression and the child’s novel one both anthropomorphize the sign. No fluent speaker
of English is likely to reinvent this child’s creative expression, and neither, perhaps, is
outlined in Leviticus 24. Shylock is equally literal in his exegesis of Laban’s husbandry of sheep, which he
reads as a precedent for usury. This literalism is litigious and exegetical, and it is also linguistic.”
32. 4.2.305-12
33. 4.2.324-32
34. 4.2.338-9
35. Kristin Denham and Anne Lobeck, Linguistics for Everyone, 2nd ed. (Boston: Wadsworth,
2013), 313
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any other child. To be sure, all children misunderstand adult speech at one time or
another and seem to have a harder time with metaphor, hyperbole, and sarcasm, but not
all children misunderstand the same speech at the same time in the same way. What is
more important to remember for our present investigation, however, is that the types of
children’s misunderstandings we attribute to literal-mindedness are, by definition,
misunderstandings. Diverging from the tacit understanding of minimally competent adult
interpreters is a necessary prerequisite for our decision to describe a child’s
(mis)understanding as a literal one, for when children take as literal a statement intended
literally, this is seldom offered up as an example of their literal-mindedness. The
examples that follow were all given as replies to the question, “[I]n what memorable
ways have your kids answered you literally?” asked on an online forum:36
1. I took my three-year-old son to see Santa. After he asked for a Buzz Lightyear
toy, Santa offered him a sticker. My son said, “No thank you, just Buzz
Lightyear.”37
2. My son and his friend were tracing each other’s body outlines on the sidewalk
with chalk. I marveled at their work, and then suggested they color in their
faces. I watched my son coloring in his face—and then noticed that his friend
had colored her actual face completely blue.38

36. “My 4-year old son was so proud to count to 5. When I asked him to count backward, he
started walking backward while counting to 5, “way to easy,” he said. Reddit, in what memorable ways
have your kids answered you literally?” submission to /r/AskReddit, 29 Nov 2012,
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/140fhd/my_4year_old_son_was_so_proud_to_count_to_5_
when/. Quotes include minor edits to spelling, formatting, punctuation and capitalization for the purpose of
readability. I have not made any changes that would alter the meaning of the stories presented here.
37. Charlie1202, comment on “My 4-year old son,”
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/140fhd/my_4year_old_son_was_so_proud_to_count_to_5_
when/c78rcot/.
38. Scrappy_Larue, Ibid.,
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/140fhd/my_4year_old_son_was_so_proud_to_count_to_5_
when/c78suw5/.
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3. A doctor assessing my then six-year-old son asked him could he write the
numbers one up to ten. He wrote the number one, drew an arrow upwards, and
wrote the number ten above it.39
4. My parents asked me to count higher. I climbed on the couch and put my
hands as high as possible and just counted to ten again. I was higher up;
technically I was correct.40
5. When my daughter was a baby, I would read her the Shakespeare Treasury
instead of baby books. When she was about three and a half, we stood behind
a man in line at the supermarket. He was nervously looking back and nibbling
on his fingernails. My daughter looks up in disgust and asks him, “Do you bite
your thumb at me, Sir?”41
6. Me: I have to pee! Dad: Can you hold it? Me: But... but won’t it drip through
my fingers?42
7. I was trying to get my girlfriend’s twenty-one-month-old daughter to eat her
food. Me holding her spoon: “Aubrey's food.” Aubrey: “No no no no
no.” Shaking her head back and forth. Me taking a bite to show that it is good.
Aubrey looking very satisfied: “Drew-Drew’s food,” and it was settled and
she would eat no more.43
8. One afternoon after daycare, my mom asked my little brother if he behaved
that day. He said, “Well, I was a little have but not much have.”44
9. One year, for Christmas, my mom got my sister a diary, as she’d been pretty
vocal about how all of her friends had one, and how much she wanted one. To
my mom’s dismay, however, she seemed to never use it, and even asked my
mom to keep it safe when she didn't need it. My mom, being a good parent,
never opened it to read what she had written inside. One day, my sister got a
39. Carcul, Ibid.,
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/140fhd/my_4year_old_son_was_so_proud_to_count_to_5_
when/c78taku/.
40. LegacyWorker, Ibid.,
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/140fhd/my_4year_old_son_was_so_proud_to_count_to_5_
when/c78r0ru/
41. lurks_mcgee, Ibid.,
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/140fhd/my_4year_old_son_was_so_proud_to_count_to_5_
when/c78ux9x/.
42. GreatTeacherAneesuka, Ibid.,
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/140fhd/my_4year_old_son_was_so_proud_to_count_to_5_
when/c78u3om/.
43. andrewsmith1986, Ibid.,
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/140fhd/my_4year_old_son_was_so_proud_to_count_to_5_
when/c78rxpg/.
44. [username removed], Ibid.,
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/140fhd/my_4year_old_son_was_so_proud_to_count_to_5_
when/c78s5dl/.
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particularly nasty bout of food poisoning, and kept asking my mom for her
diary at odd times throughout the sickness. Finally, my mom asked her how
she decided when she should write in her diary. “When I have diarrhea, of
course.” My sister thought that diaries were for logging bouts of diarrhea.45
What is common to most of these examples is that the children’s understandings
diverge from the meaning that would be normal or obvious to nearly anyone but the
particular child in question. Presumably, none of the other children waiting in line to sit
on Santa’s lap in Example 1 above interpreted the free sticker as a Christmas present, the
acceptance of which precludes the granting of one’s Christmas wish. The father’s son in
Example 2 understood him correctly even if the son’s friend did not. The children in
Examples 3 and 4 both misunderstood an adult’s instructions about counting because the
instructions included conventional metaphors related to vertical positioning, but each
child arrived at a very different solution to this linguistic puzzle. In Example 5, a child’s
unique upbringing and mindset leads her to misinterpret a stranger’s nervous nail biting
as an insult. It is unlikely that anyone else could have made the same mistake—neither a
child who grew up with more typical bedtime stories by Dr. Seuss, nor an adult familiar
with Shakespeare’s work, nor even a resident of Elizabethan London transported forward
in time. We describe as literal all deviations from an adult speaker’s intended meaning,
whether these departures are a result of sincere misunderstanding (Example 6) or a
willful twisting of language to serve one’s personal agenda (Example 7). As far as sincere
misunderstandings are concerned, we can imagine some of the interpretive mistakes
(Examples 2 and 6) being repeated by some (but not all, and perhaps not even most) other
children, but others (Examples 8 and 9) are highly idiosyncratic. When children interpret

45. kyleguillaume, Ibid.,
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/140fhd/my_4year_old_son_was_so_proud_to_count_to_5_
when/c78u6mx/.
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literally statements that minimally competent interpreters would also interpret literally,
there is no reason to take notice of the child’s interpretation or describe it as literal. But
when children interpret a colloquialism differently than intended (Example 6), invent a
novel colloquialism rather than adopting the standard one (“The sign wrote…”), or
assume a pseudo-etymology unsupported by usage history (Examples 8 and 9), these
(mis)understandings we describe as literal.
As with children, many individuals who fall somewhere on the autism spectrum
are able communicate successfully on a regular basis. When things go smoothly—when a
person on the spectrum interprets an utterance just as any other minimally competent
interlocutor would—this is never highlighted as an example of autistic literalmindedness. But as with children, whenever a person on the spectrum interprets an
utterance in an unexpected way, these lapses in successful communication are used as
evidence to justify our claims that they are literal-minded. Even before looking at specific
examples, we can reason that this is the case. If we did not find humor in the ways autism
influences a person’s way of seeing the world; if it did not cause behavioral and social
challenges at school, work, and home; and if it did not lead to ways of thinking that tend
to be different from one’s caretakers, family, peers, friends, and authority figures, then
there would be no reason to take notice of the phenomenon. When we describe an autistic
person’s (mis)understanding as literal, it is because it diverges from the tacit
understanding of a minimally competent adult interlocutor. It may also diverge from the
tacit understanding of a child who does not fall on the autism spectrum and even from
that of another child or adult on the spectrum. Furthermore, the precise nature of these
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divergences is often beyond our ability to anticipate, even when tasked with trying to
predict how someone on the spectrum might see things.
There are three phenomena common among people on the spectrum that may
seem to justify our description of such individuals as literal-minded: (1) a tendency to
interpret rules and commands legalistically, (2) visual thinking, and (3) a rigid adherence
to a “one word–one object” way of thinking. One might think that a teacher or caretaker
who is aware of the first phenomenon could avoid mishaps with extremely careful word
choice, but predicting which commands will result in confusion—and what form that
confusion will take—proves exceedingly difficult. Consider the following story about
Kevin, as presented by Mary Pittman:
Kevin […] was following written instructions in a food technology lesson when
he read, “Sprinkle flour on the worktop and roll the pastry.” Kevin proceeded to
sprinkle flour on the worktop and then to put a knife along the edge of the
worktop as if trying to damage it. When asked what he was doing he explained
that he had to get the worktop up to roll his pastry.46
Who could have predicted Kevin’s unique response to what seems a fairly
straightforward instruction? Other students did not read these instructions and briefly
consider prying off the worktop with a knife before discounting the interpretation as
needlessly destructive and therefore incorrect. Prying off the worktop is not a possible
meaning that other interlocutors first comprehend and then rule out in this situation; it is
an interpretation that would probably never occur to someone who is not on the autism
spectrum and perhaps not to any individual except Kevin himself. Kevin’s
misinterpretation here seems worthy of the descriptor literal precisely because of how

46. Mary Pittman, Helping Pupils with Autistic Spectrum Disorder to Learn (London: Chapman,
2007), 15.
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radically it departs from the meaning that would be tacit to another interpreter in the
context of a food technology lesson.
The second phenomenon that suggests a connection between autism and literalmindedness is visual thinking. Michael Barton provides us with a window into his own
particular mental worldview with his book It’s Raining Cats and Dogs. This book grew
out of his personal notes and drawings, which he made to help him memorize the
conventional meanings of expressions that confused him. His illustration for the
eponymous idiom, “it’s raining cats and dogs,” shows what the reader expect: cats and
dogs falling from the sky.47 But Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg is adamant that this is not the
image that pops into her own mind when she hears the phrase:
When I asked my non-autistic husband what he saw in his mind when he heard
this expression, he said, “Nothing. I just experience it as a metaphor for heavy
rain.” In contrast, when I hear the expression “It’s raining cats and dogs,” I
literally see the word “cats” and the word “dogs” falling down like rain. I also see
the literal rain—in fact, the words are falling with the rain and splashing into
puddles—but I don’t see visual images of cats and dogs.48
Cohen-Rottenberg’s mental image of words splashing into puddles and Barton’s image of
falling cats and dogs both result from the tendency of people on the spectrum to—from
an outside perspective—over-visualize what they hear, but the visualizations themselves
are strikingly different. This serves as an important reminder that while many people on
the spectrum experience similar phenomena, these phenomena manifest in markedly
different ways. Knowing that people on the spectrum think literally and visually is not
enough to predict the specifics of how this will play out. Cohen-Rottenberg’s unique
47. Michael Barton, It’s Raining Cats and Dogs: An Autism Spectrum Guide to the Confusing
World of Idioms, Metaphors and Everyday Expressions (London: Kingsley, 2012), 18.
48. Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg, “On Literal Thinking,” Shift, 7 August 11,
http://www.shiftjournal.com/2011/07/08/on-literal-thinking/.
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image in particular would be hard for anyone else to anticipate, and, contrary to Barton’s
experience, she reports that this delightful visual has never given her any trouble in
interpreting the idiom.49
The third phenomenon used to justify our characterization of people on the autism
spectrum as literal-minded is what Olga Bogdashina describes as “one word–one
object.”50 Bogdashina cites the following example from Liane Holliday Willey:
I vividly remember my teacher announcing, ‘Children, find your mats and
take your nap.’ I refused. Again, the teacher called my parents…
‘Liane, why won’t you take your nap?’ my parents wondered of me…
‘Because I don’t have a mat.’
‘You most certainly do have a mat. There it is in your cubby’, the teacher
replied.
‘I don’t have a mat.’
‘You see what I mean… She is an obstinate child.’
‘Why do you say you don’t have a mat?’ the folks asked, not giving up on
me.
‘That is not a mat. That is a rug,’ I honestly and accurately replied.
‘So it is,’ said my father. ‘Will you take a nap on your rug?’
‘If she tells me to,’ I said matter-of-factly.
‘Tell her to take a nap on her rug,’ my father said as my parents turned to
take me home. I wasn’t trying to be difficult, I was trying to do the right thing.
The trouble was, the teacher assumed I understood language like other children
did. I did not.51
This example once again illustrates how knowing that people on the autism spectrum
think differently is not sufficient for understanding how someone on the spectrum will
think. Although the parents in this story knew that autism, rather than insolence, was the
root of the problem, they could not fathom why their daughter was behaving the way she
was until she said, “That is not a mat. That is a rug.” What we think of as literal in this
49. Ibid.
50. Olga Bogdashina, Communication Issues in Autism and Asperger Syndrome: Do We Speak the
Same Langauge? (London: Kingsley, 2005), 54.
51. Liane Holliday Willey, Pretending to Be Normal: Living with Asperger’s Syndrome (Autism
Spectrum Disorder), rev. ed. (London: Kingsley, 2015), 24–5.
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example of explicitly literal interpretation, then, bears no resemblance to the tacitly literal
meaning of the command, “Children, find your mats and take your nap,” which would be
the simple, obvious, plain, or straightforward meaning to our idea of a minimally
competent interlocutor.
Two themes are consistent in the various examples we have been examining in
this section: (1) the more radically an interpretation differs from our estimation of the
obvious, simple, or conventional meaning—the more outlandish, humorous, or off-thewall it seems to us—the more likely we are to describe it as literal, and (2) many of these
so-called literal meanings are beyond our ability to predict, even if we were tasked with
anticipating how a literal-minded individual might interpret the word diary or the
instruction to “Sprinkle flour on the worktop and roll the pastry.” Despite what we
suggest during our meta-discussions about language, we are strangely compelled to
describe as literal precisely those interpretations that lie beyond the tendencies and even
capabilities of typical, minimally competent interlocutors. Paul Grice’s cooperative
principle gives us a theoretical framework for understanding why this counterintuitive
phenomenon is so widespread. Our final example will demonstrate just how far back it
extends in the history of the English language.
John Purvey’s Prologue to the Wycliffite Bible
Early on in my research, I made the decision to go through the first uses of literal
recorded in Early English Books Online (EEBO) one by one, tagging each with a
subjective label of “expected” or “unexpected.” I had hypothesized that many of these
early examples would seem as strange to me as Augustine’s claim that Christ “is literally
the Light but metaphorically a stone” and was initially disappointed by the apparent
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consensus among early English writers. However, I soon discovered that the uses of
literal I had labeled “expected” tended to simply insist on a distinction between literal
and other kinds of meaning without providing much additional detail. For example, the
earliest use of literal recorded in the OED comes from John Purvey’s prologue to the
Wycliffite Old Testament, probably composed before 1397: “Holy scripture hath iv
understandings; literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical.”52
As long as the difference between literal and other kinds of meaning is left to
one’s imagination and specific applications are avoided, everything seems to be in order.
Only when an author ventures into the nitty-gritty of literal interpretation does the
illusion of broad consensus begin to dissipate. To be sure, an author may still dabble in
illustrative examples and maintain the illusion. For instance, the OED actually cites a
second example of Purvey’s use of literal from the prologue that seems to illustrate the
first: “To the literal understanding it [i.e. Jerusalem] signifieth an earthly city […] to
allegory it signifieth holy church on earth […] to moral understanding it signifieth a
Christian soul […] to anagogical it signifieth holy church reigning in bliss.”53 But this
fourfold interpretation of a single word divorced from context is not where the rubber
meets the road. How does literal interpretation play out when a specific thinker interprets
a whole verse or a complicated passage or the interrelation between multiple passages? In
its effort to selectively curate representative examples, the OED glosses over Purvey’s
more complex uses of literal in the prologue, such as his overview of Scripture’s
supposed “double” literal sense:
52. Quotation modernized for readability.
53. Quotation modernized for readability. The anagogical gloss, which the OED omits in its
quotation, is retained here for the sake of completion.
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The 3rd rule is of the spirit and the letter. This rule is commonly
explained in this way: that the historical, or literal sense, and the mystical,
or spiritual sense, are taken under the same letter. For this reason, the
integrity of the story shall hold, and nevertheless it shall be referred to the
spiritual understanding. This rule may be explained in another manner that
it be related also to the literal sense, as other rules have been. About which
thing it is to say that the same letter sometimes has a double literal sense.
For instance, in the first book of Paralipomenon, the 17th chapter (1 Chr
17:13),54 God says to Solomon, “I shall be to him a father, and he shall be
to me a son.” And this to the letter is understood of Solomon, in as much as
he was the son of God by grace in youth. Therefore Nathan the prophet
called his name Amiable to the Lord in the 2nd book of Kings, the 12th
chapter (2 Sam 12:25).55 Also the previously quoted passage, “I shall be to
him a father,” etc. is brought in by Paul, in the first chapter of Hebrews
(Heb 1:5), as said to the letter of Christ himself. And this is revealed that
Paul brings in to prove: that Christ is more than angels. But such proof may
not be made by spiritual sense, as Augustine says against Vincent [the]
Donatist.56 Indeed, the previously quoted passage was fulfilled to the letter
in Solomon. Nevertheless perfectly: for he was the son of God only by
grace. But it was fulfilled more perfectly in Christ that was the son of God
by kind.
But nevertheless each statement is utterly literal. Nevertheless the
second statement, which is of Christ, is spiritual and proves in some
manner, in as much as Solomon was the figure of Christ.57
In this section, Purvey is paraphrasing the third of seven rules set forth by a 6thcentury church father, Isidore of Seville.58 To reconcile the rule “of the spirit and the
letter” with Augustine’s claim that convincing arguments can only be made from the
literal sense, Purvey inserts another paraphrase of the 14th-century French theologian
54. Paralipomenon, meaning “things passed over,” is the name used for Chronicles in the Vulgate.
55. Purvey follows the Vulgate in naming 1 & 2 Samuel the first and second book of Kings so that
1 and 2 Kings become 3 and 4 Kings in turn.
56. Letters of St. Augustine of Hippo 93.8. “For what else is it than superlative impudence for one
to interpret in his own favor any allegorical statements, unless he has also plain testimonies, by the light of
which the obscure meaning of the former may be made manifest.” trans. J. G. Cunningham, Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing, 1887), rev. and ed.
for New Advent by Kevin Knight, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102093.htm.
57. John Purvey, The true copye of a prolog, 1550, EEBO
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A15297.0001.001/1:4.14?rgn=div2;view=fulltext. Text modernized for
readability, EEBO.
58. De Summo Bono (also known as Sententiae) 1.20.
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Nicholas of Lyra’s concept of a “double” literal sense without comment or
embellishment, as if this represents his own views on the matter. If one wishes to hang on
to the belief that there existed a time in the history of English when the word literal
remained pure, unadulterated, and unambiguous prior to corruption by the ignorant
masses, it seems to me one must subscribe to Nicholas of Lyra’s particular reading of 2
Sam 7:14 and Heb 1:5 and Purvey’s attempt to reconcile Isidore with Augustine: King
Solomon and Jesus Christ are both utterly literal sons of God…but Christ even “more
perfectly” so. If, however, this exposition is at odds with one’s understanding of what
literal means, then one must conclude either that Purvey’s use is anomalous or that this
word has been used strangely since its inception in English. I hope the various examples
provided so far will be enough to convince the reader there are too many “anomalies” to
reach the former conclusion.
Conclusion
In the previous chapter, we established that literal meaning is typically
conceptualized as that which minimally competent interlocutors understand tacitly. How
surprising, then, to discover that the interpretations we explicitly describe as literal tend
to be just the opposite—the sort that occur only to incompetent or maximally competent
interlocutors. Whether we accept or reject the intensive use of l, we find that speakers use
l only when they think it will guide the audience toward non-tacit interpretations. The
absurdity of the superfluous use, along with Grice’s notion of the cooperative principle,
helps us understand why l is rarely used by speakers to indicate tacit meaning, and sounds
strange to us when it is. Furthermore, since puns, wordplay, and double entendres that
rely on l to help audiences catch the joke do not violate Grice’s cooperative principle, we
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do not balk when qualities normally considered anathema to literality are explicitly
associated with l.
When we use l to describe the interpretations of others, rather than to guide
audience interpretation of our own words, we find that the understanding of those we
characterize as literal-minded is, by definition, misunderstanding, whether accidental (as
in the case of children, people on the autism spectrum, and Amelia Bedelia) or intentional
(as in the case of genies, or a child less than two years old who smiles and says “DrewDrew’s food!”). These misunderstandings are not interpretations that minimally
competent interlocutors can predict, evaluate, and then transcend. Rather, they are the
sort that would occur only to an interlocutor who is either incompetent or maximally
competent.
Most of the examples in this chapter were drawn from everyday use in order to
demonstrate that our collective propensity for describing as literal precisely those
interpretations that deviate from the tacit understanding of minimally competent
interlocutors is not limited to those who privilege the literal meaning of Scripture.
However, we returned to another text that privileges the literal meaning of scripture for
our final example to show that this phenomenon stretches as far back as it is widely
dispersed.

CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I have been exploring the disconnect between our meta-discussions
about language (which suggest that literal meaning coincides with the tacit understanding
of minimally competent interlocutors) and the actual interpretations we end up describing
as literal outside these meta-discussions (which tend to be precisely those that deviate
from the tacit understanding of minimally competent interlocutors). This matters because
literal meaning’s perceived coherence with what is tacit to minimally competent
interlocutors is a significant reason why literal meaning is often privileged or disparaged.
In Chapter 1, I developed a litmus test for determining if this disconnect between tacitly
and explicitly literal interpretation undermines one’s reasons for privileging or
disparaging a given interpretation and applied it to two texts that privilege the literal
interpretation of Scripture.
I chose to focus on these texts because 24% of Americans polled in 2017 agree
that the Bible is best interpreted literally. Those who do not fall into this category might
unfairly assume that those who privilege the literal meaning of Scripture are particularly
susceptible to the disconnect between tacitly and explicitly literal interpretation due to
their theological bias. I hope the more generalized evidence presented in Chapter 2 will
dispel this notion and reveal a more widespread, longstanding, possibly inescapable
phenomenon. I do not believe the interlocutors who privilege literal meaning and appear
guilty of doublespeak when subjected to my litmus test or other deconstructive readings
are being intentionally duplicitous. Saussure has shown how different systems of
62
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differentiation, though arbitrary in their organization, can still communicate meaning and
appear internally coherent.
I have no doubt that many of those who continue to insist on privileging literal
interpretation, if they did acknowledge the reality of the disconnect I am trying to draw
attention to, would see themselves as exceptions to the rule. Additional applications of
the litmus test to other texts and additional examples of our collective propensity for
describing as literal precisely those meanings that deviate from the tacit understanding of
minimally competent interlocutors could be helpful in this regard.
The present investigation has only identified a phenomenon and analyzed a few
representative examples found “in the wild.” Although it was well beyond the purview of
this project, I would be excited to see what else could be learned in a controlled
laboratory setting. How, for example, might people of different religious affiliations and
varying levels of familiarity with a given passage of Scripture answer a question about its
literal meaning? And how might the question itself, method of response, and testing
environment influence the range of answers? Controlling for other factors, would
participants answer the question “What is the literal meaning of the following passage?”
differently from “Take the following passage literally”? How might answers differ
among respondents who are asked to speak their responses versus writing them down
versus typing them on a computer versus drawing a picture? And to what extent could
researchers induce certain responses by, for example, having some participants submit
descriptions of a “literal keyboard” from a computer while others use pen and paper
while sitting at a piano bench under the pretense that the university’s practice rooms were
a quiet and convenient place to conduct the study?
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Comparisons between similar literal interpretations found in the wild fall short of
the possibilities available in more controlled settings, and many questions remain
unanswered.
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